The Latin American sample involves eight countries, comprising the big four economies of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico; Colombia and Ecuadortwo countries which rely to a great extent on agriculture; the Dominican Republic, the largest Caribbean economy; and Nicaragua, the poorest country in Central America. Together, in 2000-04, these countries accounted for 78 percent of the region's population, 80 percent of the region's agricultural value added, and 84 percent of the total gross domestic product (GDP) of Latin America.
The key characteristics of these economies-which account for only 4.5 percent of worldwide GDP, but 7.7 percent of agricultural value added and more than 10 percent of agricultural and food exports-are shown in table 1. The table reveals the considerable diversity within the region in terms of stages of development, relative resource endowments, comparative advantages and, hence, trade specialization, and the incidence of poverty and income inequality. In particular, income inequality is high throughout the region compared with the rest of the world; the Gini coefficient is near or above 0.5 and averages 0.52. This is well above the Gini coefficient for Africa and Asia. Likewise, the Gini coefficient for land distribution is high in Latin America: 0.58 for Chile, but above 0.7 for Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, compared with an average of less than 0.5 in Asia (World Bank 2007) . Even so, there is comparatively little absolute poverty except in the poorest tropical parts of the region.
Though it relies on nearly twice as much agricultural land per capita as the rest of the world, Latin American agriculture is characterized by concentrated land ownership and a structure of production whereby medium and large commercial farms contribute the bulk of agricultural output. It is also a region with a high degree of urbanization. These features are important in understanding the forces behind agricultural policies. So, too, is the fact that, until a few years ago, most countries in the region were experiencing a high degree of macroeconomic instability and high inflation. The manipulation of food prices for urban consumers in an attempt to reduce inflation was (and, in Argentina, still is) a dominant feature driving farm pricing policy.
Most Latin American countries have gone through a process of major economy-wide policy reforms, which began, for some countries, approximately in the mid-1980s (or the 1970s for Chile) and, for others, in the mid-1990s. Reforms centered on macroeconomic stabilization, trade liberalization, deregulation, and some privatization of state agencies.
There was a considerable reassessment of the role of government in guiding economic development. Agricultural policies were an integral part of this reform process, although not the principle motivation of the reforms. This paper begins with a brief description of the evolution of agricultural and trade policies, then it is provided a short description of the methodology used by the authors of the individual case studies to estimate the nominal rate of assistance (NRA) to agricultural producers, the corresponding consumer tax equivalent (CTE) facing domestic buyers of agricultural products, the relative rate of assistance (RRA) between the farm and nonfarm tradable sectors, partial-equilibrium indexes of trade and welfare, and general equilibrium showing the changing extent of price distortions is then provided for each country, and the continental averages are compared with those of Asia and Africa. The paper concludes by drawing out implications of the findings, including for poverty and inequality and for possible future directions of policies affecting agricultural incentives in Latin America.
The evolution of agricultural and trade policies
From the late 1950s until approximately the mid-1980s, agricultural price interventions in the region were largely a by-product of a development strategy to encourage import-substitution industrialization. This policy also raised budgetary resources in the form of import tax revenue, which was supplemented in some countries through agricultural export taxes. Both sets of approaches harmed the region's most competitive farmers and were offset only slightly by farm credit and fertilizer subsidies.
From the late 1950s until early 1990s, there were concerns about high rates of inflation, especially where urban populations had strong political influence. Policy makers were under pressure to avoid large increases in food prices, which would potentially impact wage rates and thereby accelerate inflation.
In addition to fiscal and inflation objectives that made farm export taxes attractive, there was, in the 1950s and 1960s, a widespread belief among the region's policy makers and followers of the structuralist school associated with Prebisch (1950 Prebisch ( , 1959 Prebisch ( , 1964 , that the efficiency losses generated through the extraction of rents in agriculture were low and that the main impact would be to reduce land rents and land values. The prevailing view at the time was that farmers in Latin America were unresponsive to price incentives. While the belief in this unresponsiveness has now largely disappeared, a few countries-Argentina is one-still tax agricultural exports to generate fiscal revenues and lower consumer food prices.
By the 1980s, there was disillusionment with the results of the import-substitution strategy and wider acceptance of theoretical developments regarding the causes of inflation and macroeconomic instability in general. During the 1980s and early 1990s, a macroeconomic framework designed for open economies gradually displaced the closed economy approach in most Latin American countries. Governments introduced economywide reforms with special emphasis on macroeconomic stabilization, deregulation, unilateral trade liberalization, and privatization.
The goal of the reformers was to create a better climate for productivity and private investment in all economic sectors, including agriculture. In most Latin American countries, the major change in trade policy was the partial or total removal of most quantitative restrictions on imports and exports, the elimination of export taxes, and a program of gradual reduction in the levels of import tariffs. This yielded incentives to move resources from import-competing to export-oriented sectors, including in agriculture, which enhanced competitiveness and led to greater integration with the world economy.
By the mid-1990s, intervention in the foreign exchange markets was recognized as the most important "price distortion" affecting the agricultural economy. At the outset of the reforms, it was expected that trade liberalization and the reduction of the fiscal deficit would lead to a depreciation of the real exchange rate Valdés 1988, 1991 ).
Yet, the reforms were followed by a significant appreciation of the currency that was associated with the opening of the capital account, greater inward foreign investment, and a major increase in domestic real interest rates. Reforms in the service sector also played a critical role. Deregulation and privatization had a major impact on the availability in the marketplace of the more-reliable and lower-cost services used in agriculture such as ports, airlines, and shipping transport.
The timing of reforms differed somewhat across countries. Colombia, for example, became a more open economy through export promotion beginning in 1967; it adopted a more ambitious liberalization of trade in 1990 and then went into a policy reform reversal beginning in 1992.
In Chile, the controlled markets of 1950 to 1974, accentuated during Allende's land reform years were followed by radical economic reforms toward trade liberalization, deregulation, and privatization between 1978 and 1982, before a second phase of reforms beginning in 1984.
Mexico introduced strong policy changes starting in the mid-1980s, before the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement. The changes involved more openness, deregulation, and privatization, a reduction in credit subsidies, and major changes in the role of government in the marketing of farm products.
A wide variety of policy instruments have been applied to influence agricultural prices, even during the post-reform period. Colombia, for example, has had minimum support prices, in addition to import tariffs, price compensation schemes, procurement agreements, a monopoly on grain imports by a government agency, export licenses and subsidies, and safeguards on imports; moreover, until 1990, all imports of inputs were subject to prior import licenses. Then, in 1995, tariffs and tariff surcharges associated with price bands on more than 100 products were introduced.
Mexico is another leader in interventions, including in the transition from highly government-controlled markets before the mid-1980s to more market-oriented policies. Its policies include price support programs (before the mid-1980s and in conjunction with state trading), credit and input subsidies, and direct income payments to farmers (ProCampo).
Argentina has simpler interventions. Agricultural exportables that are also wage goods have been subjected to export taxes, complemented by export bans in some years. The return to sizeable export taxes in late 2001 and their subsequent rises has been controversial, with the most recent rises leading to prolonged protests by farmers in urban areas in mid-
2008.

The extent of distortions to agricultural incentives in Latin America
a. Methodology: Quantifying the extent of distortions
To quantify government-imposed distortions that create a gap between domestic prices and what they would be under free markets, In addition to the NRA, we also consider the extent to which consumers are taxed or subsidized. To do so, a Consumer Tax Equivalent (CTE) is computed as the percentage by which the price that consumers pay for their food exceeds the international price of each food product at the border. Differences between the NRA and the CTE can arise from distortions in the domestic economy that are caused by transfer policies and taxes/subsidies that cause the prices paid by consumers (adjusted to the farmgate level) to differ from those received by producers; but in the absence of such differences, the CTE for each tradable farm product is Since the NRA cannot be less than -100 percent if producers are to earn anything, neither can the RRA (since the weighted average NRAnonag t is non-negative in all our country case studies). And if both of those sectors are equally assisted, the RRA is zero. This measure is useful in that if it is below (above) zero, it provides an internationally comparable indication of the extent to which a country's sectoral policy regime has an anti-(pro-)agricultural bias.
2 Our definition of a policy-induced price distortion follows Bhagwati (1971) and Corden (1997) and includes any policy measure at a country's border (such as a trade tax or subsidy, a quantitative restriction on trade, or a dual or multiple foreign exchange rate system, or any domestic producer or consumer tax/subsidy/restraint on output, intermediate inputs or primary factors of production (except where needed to directly overcome an externality, or where it is set optimally across all products or factors, for example as a value added tax to raise government revenue). 3 Farmers are affected not just by prices of their own products but also by the incentives nonagricultural producers face. That is, it is relative prices and hence relative rates of government assistance that affect producer incentives. More than seventy years ago Lerner (1936) provided his Symmetry Theorem that proved that in a two-sector economy, an import tax has the same effect as an export tax. This carries over to a model that also includes a third sector producing only nontradables.
assumed to be the same as the NRA from border distortions and the CTE for nontradable farm products is assumed to be zero. Quantifying this distortion in nonfarm tradable sectors as accurately as the quantification of the distortion in agriculture has not been possible. National case study authors have had to rely on applied trade taxes (for exports, as well as imports) rather than undertaking price comparisons for all nonfarm goods, and, hence, they have not captured the quantitative restrictions on trade that were important in earlier decades but that have been less important recently. Nor have they captured distortions in the services sectors; many of these sectors now produce tradables (or would do so in the absence of interventions preventing the emergence of this production). As a result, the NRAs for nonfarm importables are underestimated, and the decline indicated is less rapid than the decline that actually occurred.
The situation is similar for nonfarm exportables, except that the actual NRAs would have been negative in most cases. Of these two elements of underestimation, the former bias probably dominated. Thus, the case study authors' estimates of the overall NRA for nonagricultural tradables should be considered as lower-bound estimates; this is especially true as we go back in time, so that the decline indicated by the NRA is less rapid than it actually was. It reveals that Latin American countries have reformed considerably more than countries in Africa, and like Asia they now have an average RRA of close to zero. However, apparently its policy regimes were not as negative towards farmers as those of Asia during the final onethird of the 20 th century.
(d) Consumer tax equivalents of agricultural policies
The extent to which farm policies impact on the retail consumer price of food and on the price of livestock feedstuffs depends on a wide range of factors, including the degree of processing undertaken and the extent of competition along the value chain. We therefore attempt only to examine the importance of the impact of policies on the buyer's price at the level where the farm product is first traded internationally and, hence, where price comparisons are made.
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What impact have these distortions had over time on trade and national economic welfare?
One way to indicate the impact of the distortions to covered farm products has been suggested by Anderson and Neary (2005) For the region as a whole, its time path for these indicators again has followed Asia's and been more substantial than in Africa.
Computable general equilibrium modeling of effects of price and trade policies
While the above indexes of trade and welfare reduction offer very useful indications over time of how much agricultural price and trade policies have been distorting national farm sectors, they are nonetheless only partial in the sense that reforms to policies in other sectors -which may have an indirect effect on farmer incentives -are not taken into account. The LINKAGE model is a relatively straightforward CGE model, in which factor stocks are fixed, producers minimize costs subject to constant returns to scale production technology, consumers maximize utility, and all markets are cleared with flexible prices.
There are three types of production structures. Crop sectors reflect the substitution possibilities between extensive and intensive farming; livestock sectors reflect the substitution possibilities between pasture and intensive feeding; and all other sectors reflect standard capital/labor substitution. There are two types of labor, skilled and unskilled. There is a single representative household per modeled region, allocating income to consumption using the extended linear expenditure system. Trade is modeled using a nested Armington structure in which aggregate import demand is the outcome of allocating domestic absorption between domestic goods and aggregate imports, and then aggregate import demand is allocated across source countries to determine the bilateral trade flows. 6 In terms of model closure, government fiscal balances are fixed, with the fiscal objective being met by changing the level of lump sum taxes on households. This implies that losses of tariff revenues are replaced by higher direct taxes on households. The current account balance also is fixed. Given that other external financial flows are fixed, this implies that ex ante changes to the trade balance are reflected in ex post changes to the real exchange rate. For example, if import tariffs are reduced, the propensity to import increases and additional imports are financed by increasing export revenues. The latter typically is achieved by a depreciation of the real exchange rate. Finally, investment is driven by savings. With fixed public and foreign saving, investment comes from changes in the savings behavior of households and from changes in the unit cost of investment. The model only solves for relative prices, with the numéraire, or price anchor, being the export price index of manufactured exports from high-income countries. This price is fixed at unity in the base year. were removed, the share of global production of farm products and food that is exported would rise from 11.4 to 15.4 percent, thereby reducing instability of prices and quantities of those products traded. This would benefit Latin America especially, given that agriculture and food products are 2.2 times more important to its exports than to the rest of the world's exports.
Third, the developing countries' share of the world's primary agricultural exports rose from 43 to 55 percent, and its farm output share from 58 to 62 percent, because of those reforms, with rises in nearly all agricultural industries except rice and sugar. Removing remaining goods market distortions would boost their export and output shares to 64 and 65 percent, respectively. Because of the importance of farm products in the exports of Latin America, it enjoys exceptionally large proportions of those developing country share gains.
Fourth, the average real price in international markets for agricultural and food products would have been 13 percent lower had policies not changed over the quarter century to 2004. Evidently the impact of reforms in high-income countries (including the cuts in farm export subsidies) in raising international food prices more than offset the opposite impact of reforms (including the cuts in agricultural export taxes) in developing countries over that period. By contrast, removing remaining distortions as of 2004 is projected to raise the international price of agricultural and food products by less than 1 percent on average (Table   9 ). This is contrary to earlier modeling results based on the GTAP protections database (e.g. (table 10) .
Sixth, for developing countries as a group, net farm income (value added in agriculture) would have been 5 percent lower without the reforms of the quarter century to 2004, and 10 percent lower in Latin America, which is many times more than the proportional gains for non-agriculture. If policies remaining in 2004 were removed, net farm incomes would rise a further 37 percent for Latin America and 6 percent for all developing countries, compared with just 2 percent for non-agricultural value added (table 11) . As well, returns to unskilled workers in developing countries -the majority of whom work on farmswould rise more than returns to other productive factors from that liberalization. In Latin America that is also true except for land rents, which are affected even more positively than unskilled labor. Together, these findings suggest both inequality and poverty globally could be alleviated by such reform, given that three-quarters of the world's poor are in farm households in developing countries (Chen and Ravallion 2008) ; but in Latin America inequality reforms may have increased inequality in so far as agricultural land is still owned by the wealthy.
Poverty, inequality and policy implications
The most salient feature of price and trade policies in the Latin American region since the CTEs across products and across countries in the region. The CTEs (like the NRAs) are highest for milk, rice, and sugar, but are negative, on average, for maize, beef, and soybeans.
The decline in negative RRAs has been caused as much by cuts in protection in
nonagricultural sectors as by reforms in agricultural policies. This underscores the fact that the reductions in distortions in agricultural incentives in the region have been part of a series of economy-wide reform programs and have not been caused merely by farm policy reforms.
The recent and prospective reforms have benefitted unskilled workers in the region
but have benefitted landholders even more. That suggests domestic income and wealth redistribution policies may need to be adjusted in Latin America if reforms are to not exacerbate inequality in the region.
The assistance trends are encouraging in that they signal the long period of encouraging import substitution in the industrial sector and of taxing primary exports, which so heavily discriminated against the agricultural sector in Latin America, has been largely relegated to history. However, as the above summary makes clear, this does not mean that policies are no longer distorting agricultural incentives. And, if Latin America were to follow the policy path chosen by more-advanced economies that involves increasing agricultural assistance as per capita incomes rise, there may be even more distortion in the future. This suggests that vigilance will be needed among economic policy advisors in the years to come.
Meanwhile, the opposite policy problem remains in Argentina, where explicit export taxation was reintroduced in late 2001 and has been increased a number of times since then.
Trade taxes, whether on agricultural imports to reduce import competition for the benefit of poor farmers, or on agricultural exports to lower the cost of food for the urban poor, are not the most efficient way to reduce poverty (Winters, McCulloch, and McKay 2004) . Trade policy instruments are almost never the first-best way to reduce poverty. On the contrary, food trade taxes may even worsen poverty, depending on the earning and spending patterns of poor households and on the alternative tax-raising instruments available. Far more preferable would be microeconomic reforms to mitigate the deep-seated structural problems affecting the competitiveness of factor and goods markets. This is because the reforms have accentuated the differences between commercially oriented farmers and farmers who are less prepared to take advantage of economic reform. Although countries have adopted various policies to mitigate the human costs of economic adjustment (especially since the mid- 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 Exportables Import-competing Total Source: , based on estimates reported in Anderson and Valdés (2008) . 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 NRA ag tradables NRA non-ag tradables RRA a The RRA is defined as 100*[(100+NRAag 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 percent Asia Africa LAC a Revealed comparative advantage index is the share of agriculture and processed food in national exports as a ratio of that sector's share of global exports.
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